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ABSTRACT
The primary purpose of this thesis is to update the established findings on the
complementary relationship between venture capital (VC) investments and fed-
eral R&D funds in stimulating inventive activities concerning about artificial
intelligence (AI) patenting. Using panel data from 1990 to 2014 on top 150
MSAs/CMSAs, OLS regression results with fixed-effect estimates implied that
i) the supply of VC investment increased the rates of patents, AI patents, and
IT patents; ii) calculations of elasticity indicated that federal R&D funds signifi-
cantly influenced the development of frontier technological inventive activities
like AI instead of the traditional information technologies; iii) the complemen-
tary effect between VC investments and federal R&D funds consistently exited
on the growth of patents, AI patents, and IT patents; and iv) the elasticity of VC
investments reached the largest on the rates of AI patents when there is a high
presence of federal R&D funds within an MSA/CMSA. Besides, the OLS results
remained robust after altering the number of top MSA/CMSA selected, relax-
ing the searching criteria of AI patents, and changing the patents selection with
a subset that contains only USPC classification codes, respectively. However, IV
estimates didn’t show robustness to the OLS results with fixed effects estimates.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It is widely understood that there exhibits a positive correlation between inno-
vation and productivity growth [1] [17]. The faith has been a strong reason for
firms and governments to allocate a large portion of financial resources on in-
ventive activities. Previous findings have shown the support of public research
funding and the accessibility of private financial resources are often related to
the progress on scientific inventions [16][21] . With the popularity of frontier
technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), it is of growing interest in what con-
tributes to the prosperity of AI invention. Specifically, there are many questions
to be asked: Does the geographical distribution of investments match with the
emerging areas of AI technologies? What kinds of public and private invest-
ments are indispensable to AI invention? Does private or public capital flows
primary influence on AI invention? Will the coexisting of both parties makes
inventive outcomes better off?
In this thesis, I intend to study the relationship between public and private re-
search funding concerning AI-related patenting behavior. Extending this line of
inquiry, I started by choosing proper measurements of AI invention activities
and financial investments. Based on the empirical models and evidence that
show a positive relationship between patents and R&D [8] [11] [12] [22], this
thesis adopted the count of patents as the measurement of invention activities.
However, the definition of AI patents has not achieved a certain consensus. Mo-
tivated by the work of Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern (2018) [6], this thesis ap-
plied their criteria of AI patents selection, which uses USPC code and keywords
found in peer-reviewed and public-domain literature on AI. The thesis further
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developed the analysis in depth by building up a comparison group, non-AI
IT patents, which contains the most related but non-AI patents. The construc-
tion of a comparison group was inspired by the paper of Forman, Goldfarb, and
Greenstein (2016) [9]. Their paper extensively documented different regional
growth patterns of ICT and non-ICT patents. Whereas, this thesis modified this
comparison and construed a group of non-AI IT patents using the HJT class
[10] that AI USPC sub-classes are indented under. For the measurement of AI-
related investments, I referred the fact from Rin, Hellmann, and Puri’s paper on
venture capital research survey [19] that technology companies especially start-
ups and enterprises have strong propensity to acquire financial support from
Venture Capital (VC) investments. Meanwhile, prior work has assessed the role
of VC in entrepreneurship [14] [20] [21]. Their findings consistently suggest that
increasing in VC investment activities is associated with a significantly growth
of patenting rates. Apart from the role of VC, public research funding is often
recognized as another factor that influences technological development[21] [24].
Moreover, the comparison between public and private research has been one of
the fundamental issues discussed in the field of policy design [2] [16] [20].
To connect all the dots into a line, this thesis will focus on exploring: i) if there
exists a positive relationship between VC investments and growth in patents
as suggested in previous findings [20][24] ; ii) if the relationship between VC
investments and patenting rates are likely to be stronger for frontier technolo-
gies, such as AI; iii) if there exists a complementary relationship between public
and private RD on patenting rates as suggested in previous findings [20]; iv)
if there exists a relationship between public and private RD and its potential
complementarity for AI and non-AI software patents.
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As a quick reminder, this thesis will be arranged in the following order: i) a lit-
erature review discussing studies on regional pattern of patenting and relation-
ships between public and private research funding; ii) data and methodology
used to study the comparison and complementary effect between VC invest-
ments and public research funding on three selections of patenting; iii) a sum-
mary of the main results with discussions of problems and future work; iv) the
appendix consisting of descriptive statistics and results from robustness checks.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Comparison of patenting, AI patenting, and IT patenting
Previously, several investigations have been conducted on exploring the re-
gional patterns of patenting and its dynamics in accelerating technology com-
mercialization [7]. For instance, Powell (2002) [18] identifies the cluster of in-
novation as an essential factor of production in the commercial field of biotech-
nology. Carlino and Kerr (2015) [4] reviews the connections between the re-
gional patterns of agglomeration and innovation using patents as a principle
measurement; Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2016) [9] find the dominance
of patenting in the Bay area. However, less literature is found to document the
patenting pattern of a specific technology with details. This thesis applied the
criteria of AI patents selection, which developed by Cockburn, Henderson, and
Stern [6] using USPC code and keywords found in peer-reviewed and public-
domain literature on AI. To update the findings on regional patterns, figures
2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 plotted the fractions of utility patents, non-AI IT patents, and
AI patents selections in top 10 MSA/CMSA over the decade from 1990 to 2014
as a demonstrate of different regional patenting patterns applied over the pe-
riod. Aligned with findings from Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2016) [9],
the graphs in this thesis revealed a substantial agglomeration of invention, es-
pecially technology-related invention, in urban areas. It could also be observed
from figure 2.3 that the Bay area, New York metro area, and Boston metro area
are the top three clusters of AI inventions.
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Figure 2.1: Fraction of Utility Patents in Top 10 MSAs/CMSAs
Figure 2.2: Fraction of non-AI IT Patents in Top 10 MSAs/CMSAs
Furthermore, both invention and investments tend to be localized. Starting
from late 90’s (even earlier in IT industry), the San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose
area has surpassed other MSAs/CMSAs in both total number of patents, IT
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patents, and AI patents (seen in figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3); meanwhile, west coast
cities lead with 61.7% in value and 39.5 % out of 130.9 billion dollars invested
across 8,948 deals reported in 20181. Indeed, the concentration of invention
activities echos the focus on the local expansion of VC investment activities.
Sorenson and Stuart [23] evaluates the concentration of venture capitalists, that
is the information of contacts and connections is more likely to be shared within
regions. Samila and Sorenson [20] documented their findings on areas that are
VC-backed, or mentioned by them as in the ”local venture capital community”,
has more substantial effectiveness with converting academic research into inno-
vations with VC supply. Chen, Gompers, and Lerner (2010) [5] show that there
exists the geographic concentration by venture capital firms and their targeted
companies in San Francisco, Boston, and New York.
Figure 2.3: Fraction of AI Patents in Top 10 MSAs/CMSAs
1Sources: https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/18-charts-to-illustrate-us-vc-in-2018
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2.2 Public and private funding: competition or cooperation?
While many studies examine economic outcomes or the market value of inven-
tive actives [1] [8], there is a growing interest in how financial investments can
fuel innovation reciprocally [2] [14] [20] [21]. Wallsten (2000) [24] attempts to
estimate the effect of government grants on private innovation outcomes. Lach
(2002) [15] extensively studies the rewards of R&D subsidizes using data on Is-
raeli manufacturing firms in the 1990s. Additionally, mixed evidence is founded
about whether public research fund could significantly increase the innovation
outcomes [18] [24]. By contrast, studies on private investment reveal that there
exist positive effects of financial investments on foresting adoption of technolo-
gies and establishment of firms [19] [20]. A recent work of Breznitz, Forman,
and Wen (2018) [3] suggests that experience in a particular industry will in-
crease the complementarity between VC financing and the introduction of new
products for firms.
The comparison between public and private research funding also plays a ma-
jor part in the discussion of the field. Few studies compare the efficiency of
private and public grants [2] [8] [18]. However, one can still be challenged
given the multidimensional heterogeneity of regions, products, and business
types. Questions are also asked about if the government funding is a comple-
ment or substitute of private research funding. To provide answers, Samila and
Sorenson (2010) [20] use a panel data on metropolitan areas to demonstrate the
complementary effect between VC investment and technology commercializa-
tion outcomes; Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti (2013) [16] use Probit and To-
bit panel data models to estimate on financial data and argue that government
funding to universities complements with private research funding.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA
This thesis assembled a panel data from 1990 to 2014 for 248 MSAs/CMSAs.1
The panel data summary, as shown in table 3.1, contains eight variables in five
categories: 1) annual census estimates of population; 2) federal support for re-
search and development; 3) the count of patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT
patents with at least one US inventors and weighted by the frequency of in-
vestor locations; 4) VC deal measurements including the number of deals and
the disclosed amount achieved at each round of VC deal as with portfolio com-
panies; 5) annual average return rates to limited partners (LP).2
Variables Mean Std. Dev. N
Population (thousands) 914.3 2,088.4 6,200
Federal R&D Fund (millions) 75.5 215.9 6,200
Patents 330.1 1,193.7 6,200
AI Patents 1.6 8.2 6,200
Non-AI IT Patents 31.2 146.6 6,200
VC Deal Count 15.8 89.9 6,200
VC Deal Amount (disclosed, millions) 118.2 922.0 6,200
LP Return (%) 0.2 0.5 6,200
Notes: Variables are at the level of MSA/CMSA-year.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
To control for data quality, I set the time window as between 1990 and 20143.
First, there is usually a 3-5 year lag between the patent application date and
grant date. Next, there is a change in classification system occurring between
2013 and 2015.4 To avoid the pollution from the lag period and classification
1The definition of MSA/CMSA in this paper is the version released by U.S. Census Bureau
on December 7, 1999 with revision on May 1, 2003. Even though the Census Bureau released an
updated crosswalk for CBSA/MSA/PMSA, this thesis uses the 1999 definition only for logical
consistency. According to the 1999 definition, there are overall 280 MSAs/CMSAs.
2Construction of LP return follows the approach from Samila and Sorenson (2010). [20] The
construction and modification will be specified in later sections.
3All the dates associated with the variables is obtained in the calendar year.
4USPTO has been gradually moved from USPC to CPC to classify the US granted patents
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change, I ended the time-frame when the total number of patents starts to drop
dramatically (as shown in figure A.1). I mapped inventors to counties and
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and consolidated MSAs (CMSAs) if ap-
plicable. The reason for utilizing MSA/CMSA as the unit of aggregation fol-
lows the logic from Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2016) [9] and Samilla
and Sorenson (2010) [20]. First, based on the assumption that VC funds are usu-
ally invested locally. Second, based on the fact that technological inventions
have a propensity to agglomerate in urban regions. Consequently, the notion of
metropolitan statistical areas suits the nature of this paper’s analyses. Besides,
I kept 248 MSAs/CMSAs (out of 280), which with at least VC investment data
available. For MSAs/CMSAs with missing VC measurements, the assumption
is that the relationship between patenting behavior and VC investment is un-
known for those areas, and hence, I excluded them.
3.1 Data sources
The source of population data is census U.S. intercensal county population data
from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).5 Federal RD fund data
is extracted from the results of the Survey of Federal Science and Engineer-
ing Support to Universities, Colleges, and Nonprofit Institutions from the Na-
tional Science Foundation (NSF).6 Patents data is obtained from the PatentsView
datasets managed by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).7 VC deal
starting on Jan 2013. (Source: https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-
search/classification-standards-and-development) However, there is no official notice on the
actual end date when the USPTO stopped issuing USPC codes for patents. From data accessed
on PatentsView, I observed the change stopped on Jan, 2015.
5Source: https://www.nber.org/data/census-intercensal-county-population.html
6Source: https://ncsesdata.nsf.gov/ids/fss
7Source: http://www.patentsview.org/download/
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data is downloaded through SDC Platinum by Thomson Reuters8. The annual
average endowment return rates are available from the National Association of
College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) historic endowment study
data.9 The next section will elaborate more on data consolidation process and
variable generation.
3.2 Variable description
3.2.1 Dependent variables
Utility Patents (Patents). The original patents granted in the US are first fil-
tered by patent type equals ”Utility”. The reason this thesis is using utility
patents only is that utility patents are mainly on products, process, and ma-
chine, which is proper for the scope of technological invention. Under the selec-
tion of US granted utility patents, I first identified each patent’s inventors ad-
dresses as domestic or foreign and then cross-walked the domestics addresses
to MSA/CMSA code. Particularly, I geocoded the addresses of inventors us-
ing Google API and matched the geo-coordinates with FIPS through overlaying
functions in ArcGIS; then, I matched with the MSA/CMSA code for each FIPS
code under the 1999 definition 10. Then, I dropped those patents with all foreign
inventors. In addition, I dropped the patents before 1990 and after 2014. Finally,
patents are counted (and logged) within each MSA/CMSA per year. In sum-
mary, the final selection of US granted patents are restricted to utility patents
8Date of access: June 05, 2019
9Source: https://www.nacubo.org/Research/2019/Historic-Endowment-Study-Data
10Source: https://www.census.gov/population/estimates/metro-city/99mfips.txt.
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that are applied between 1990 and 2014 and with at least one US inventor11. To
simplify the naming of this variable, I will refer to this selection as ”Patents”.
AI Patents. The selection of AI patents uses the patents selected by the criteria
above and applies a definition of AI patent classification from Cockburn, Hen-
derson, Stern (2018) [6]. AI patents are identified within the patent selection in
two additional ways: 1) by using USPC classification12 706 (Data Processing-
Artificial Intelligence) and 901 (Robots), and 2) by searching patent titles utiliz-
ing a list of keywords13. After taking the union of patents obtained from 1) and
2), I deleted the duplicates and counted (and logged) the number of AI patents
within each MSA/CMSA per year.
Non-AI IT Patents (IT Patents). The selection of non-AI IT patents is also based
on the utility patent selection. Following Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein
(2016) [9], I identified the patents with USPC code under HJT subcategory 22
(Computer Hardware and Software) and 53 (Motor, Engines, and Parts) using
a USPC-based patent subject classification developed by Hall, Jaffe and Trajten-
berg (2001) [10]. I used these two subcategories because the two USPC classifica-
tions that are used to identify AI patents are indented under them, respectively.
Therefore, patents with HJT 22 and 53 are supposed to be a broader selection
that contains AI patents and the closest comparison of AI patents. To construct
the comparison group only, I excluded the AI patents and counted (and logged)
the rest of patents with HJT subcategory 22 and 53 within each MSA/CMSA per
year. I will later abbreviate this selection of patents as ”IT Patents”.
11I also dropped patents with application date greater than grant date and with no FIPS code
matched. Fortunately, those patents are only in a negligible fraction.
12U.S. Patent Classification System (USPC) is used by USPTO to categorize patents by their
major and minor components.
13The list of keyword is available at the Appendix in Cockburn, Henderson, Stern (2018) [6]
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3.2.2 Independent variables
VC Activities Measurements (VC Deal Count; VC Deal Amount). VC activities mea-
surements are aggregated from raw data as with portfolio companies at the deal
level. I first selected deals from 1990 to 2014 by round date and then kept only
the deals where companies are at the stage (level 2) of Seed, Early Stage, Later
Stage, and Expansion. The reason of including those stages before companies go-
ing to public or in market is that the instrument variable requires one to include
only deals invested by VC funds with limited partners. [20] Using the zip-code
of portfolio companies, I located each deal to MSAs/CMSAs and counted (and
logged) the number of VC deals within each MSA/CMSA per year. As a sec-
ond way to measure VC investment activities, I also aggregated (and logged)
the amount disclosed for each VC deal within each MSA/CMSA per year. A
special reminder about the aggregation method as compared with Samila and
Sorenson’s is that this thesis applied locations of portfolio companies instead of
locations of VC fund. Essentially, VC funds will be used for investments by VC
firms to portfolio companies. To be more precisely, the capital flow starts from
the VC funds and goes to targeted portfolio companies. In Samila Sorensons
paper [20], they argue that they are using the starting location (i.e. VC fund lo-
cation) of the capital flow. This thesis, nevertheless, uses the destination of the
same cash flow to locate the capital flow.
Federal R&D Fund. Federal R&D fund data is originally acquired at the institu-
tional level with institutional names and state information. I selected the federal
R&D fund from 1990 to 2014, geo-coded the addresses of inventors and matched
the geo-coordinates with FIPS then MSA/CMSA code. The amount of federal
R&D fund is finally counted (and logged) within each MSA/CMSA per year.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES
4.1 Empirical model
ln Pati,t = α + β1 ln Popi,t + β2 lnRDi,t + β3 lnVCi,t + β4 lnVCi,t lnRDi,t + ωt + ηi + i,t
(4.1)
ln AIPati,t = α + β1 ln Popi,t + β2 lnRDi,t + β3 lnVCi,t + β4 lnVCi,t lnRDi,t +ωt + ηi + i,t
(4.2)
ln ITPati,t = α+ β1 ln Popi,t + β2 lnRDi,t + β3 lnVCi,t + β4 lnVCi,t lnRDi,t +ωt + ηi + i,t,
(4.3)
where i indexes the MSA and t represents year (calendar year). Pati,t, AIPati,t,
and ITPati,t are dependent variables used at different stages in each regression.
Popi,t controls for population size. RDi,t measures the federal R&D fund inflows
and VCi,t measures the VC activities at the region level. VCi,t contains two vari-
ables, namely, VCcounti,t and VCamounti,t. To capture the complementary effect
between public research funding and VC investments, the model also includes
the interaction between federal R&D fund and VCcounti,t and VCamounti,t, re-
spectively. ωt denotes the year-specific fixed effects (year dummies); ηi rep-
resents the MSA/CMSA-specific fixed effect; while, i,t means the error term.
Here, the year-specific fixed effects ascribe to explain the change in national
economy climate accross MSA/CMSA over time. By contrast, the MSA/CMSA-
specified fixed effects attribute to all the characteristics within MSA/CMSAs.
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4.2 Identification
4.2.1 Construction of instrumental variable
Through including MSA/CMSA-specific fixed effects, the model has identified
the heterogeneity in different MSAs/CMSAs. However, concerns may also arise
from unobserved factors that are correlated with the amount of local VC invest-
ment supply and other unobservables. As touched upon in Samila and Soren-
son (2010) [20] and Samila and Sorenson (2011) [21], the return of VC investment
to local investors produces different incentives for local VC investors. This the-
sis adopted their assumptions and construction of IV with a slight modification.
The initial LP return consists of the annual endowment return rate and the num-
ber of limited partners (LP) who has invested in any fund within the desirable
time-frame. By contrast, the number of investors I used to generate LP return
is the number of LP investors at each VC deal. By changing the total number
of LPs invested in funds a particular MSA/CMSA to the number of LPs partici-
pated in each deal, the construction of LP return was adjusted to the same level
of aggregation as other VC measurements.
LP returns. To summarize it, the formula is given by:
ln LPRi,t =
t−3∑
s=t−1
ERs ln(1 + LPcounti,s) (4.4)
where i indexes the MSA and t represents year (calendar year). ERs represents
the annual average return rates to U.S. higher education endowments and affil-
iated foundations in %, and LPcounti,s is the number of LP investors for each VC
deal.
The justification of using this IV on VC investment measures generally followed
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the assumption proposed by Samila and Sorenson (2010) [20]. First of all, LP
returns are proved to be the primary inventive to limited partners since institu-
tional investors often refer to an unchanged rate to allocate their assets across
different asset classes. The fixed asset allocation rate, however, is usually de-
termined by the historical return rates by asset class. [21] Second, the pref-
erence of institutional investors are not correlated with other variables in the
equations. This propensity is described as ”home bias” by Samila and Sorenson
(2010) in their paper. Third, ”home bias” existed in VC funds when they make
investments on portfolio companies. The three assumptions overall guaranteed
that the IV, LP return, influences VC investments without being correlated with
omitted variables that will affect patenting.
4.2.2 MSA/CMSA selection and robustness checks
The selection of top 150 MSAs/CMSAs is driven by the fact that the panel is ex-
tremely unbalanced with missing VC investments measurements and public re-
search fund for smaller MSAs/CMSAs. Apart from the analysis that analogous
to Samila and Sorenson (2010) [20], the assumption from this thesis is that both
inventive and VC investment activities are negligible in small MSAs/CMSAs.
The reason of excluding small MSAs/CMSAs with little or none VC invest-
ments is that the relationship between local investment and patenting is likely
to be different in these locations and that some of these locations may not have
any inventive activity (or at least the type that shows up in patents).
To test the resilience of the main model, I constructed the robustness checks in
five ways: i) changing the criteria of choosing top MSAs/CMSAs; ii) decreas-
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ing the number of top MSA included in main regression tables; iii) including all
MSAs/CMAs in main regression tables; iv) altering the AI definition by using
a different searching strategy; v) using a subset of patents selection which con-
tains USPC code for all patents.1 By changing the number of MSA/CMSAs in-
cluded in the analysis, I sought to test if excluding more small MSA/CMSAs can
affect the results and if the exclusion is crucial for improving the model. To de-
termine if the AI definition imported is reasonably reliable, I employed another
searching strategy when selecting AI patents using patent titles. Specifically,
I allowed intervals or changing of orders for keywords when searching and
consequently enlarged the AI patents selection. Eventually, I selected patents
with only USPC codes, sorted out the AI and non-AI IT patents using the same
strategies for the entire collection of patents. As one may recall, there exists an
inconsistency in defining AI and non-AI IT patents. Two components that com-
prise the AI patents selection are patents with USPC subclass 706 and 901 and
patents that contain keywords in their titles. Nevertheless, non-AI IT patents
are only identified by USPC sub-classes fall into HJT class 22 and 53. It could
be inferred, therefore, that some of the AI patents are not within the scope of
IT patents since USPTO started issuing less USPC code to the patents granted
after 2013. This complexity is better visualized by figures A.2 and A.3 in Chap-
ter A of the Appendix. With a compromise of losing new patents and new AI
patents without USPC code, I provided the subset of patents with USPC code
to replicate the key analysis to avoid the definition inconsistency.
1Detailed results can be found in Chapter C of the Appendix.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Following equations 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, I conducted OLS regressions with fixed-
effect estimates on utility patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT patents, respec-
tively, for top 150 MSAs/CMSAs by total number of patents. To better present
the results, the analysis will be segmented into four parts as table C.1, table C.2.
Table 5.1 compares well with the main results from Samila and Sorenson (2010)
[20]; whereas, tables C.1 and C.2 are analyses to show the difference in comple-
mentary effects on AI patents and non-AI IT patents. Following the construction
of IV, I instrumented LP return on VC deal counts in main tables C.1 and C.2,
respectively, and presented the results in tables 5.2.
5.1 Fixed effects estimation results
From Table 5.1, the OLS regression with fixed-effect estimators on VC deal count
and amount in columns (1) and (3), respectively, indicates that both public re-
search fund and VC activities accelerate the rates of patenting after controlling
for variations across and within MSAs/CMSAs. With population and federal
R&D fund fixed within one MSA/CMSA, the elasticity of the counts of VC deals
with respect to the count of patents is 0.0484. In other words, if one MSA/CMSA
has its count of VC deal doubled, there will be 11 more patents applied on
average within a year (0.0484 × ln 2 × 330.1 (mean of Patents) = 11.07). With
population and federal R&D fund fixed within one MSA/CMSA, the elastic-
ity of the aggregated amount of VC deal in millions with respect to the count
of patents is 0.0244. Similarly, if one MSA/CMSA has its size of aggregated VC
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deal amount doubled, there would be 6 more patents applied on average within
a year (.0244 × ln 2 × 330.1 (mean of Patents) = 5.58). In columns (2) and (4), the
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Patents Patents Patents Patents
Population (t-1) 1.111*** 1.090*** 1.097*** 1.081***
(0.129) (0.128) (0.130) (0.128)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0802*** 0.0474** 0.0807*** 0.0584***
(0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0208)
VC Deal Count (t) 0.0484*** -0.0260
(0.0129) (0.0185)
VC Deal Count (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0267***
(0.00614)
VC Deal Amount (t) 0.0244*** -0.00735
(0.00570) (0.00886)
VC Deal Amount (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0124***
(0.00321)
Observations 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952
R-squared 0.215 0.225 0.215 0.221
Number of MSA/CMSA 248 248 248 248
Time Period 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
MSA/CMSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression, clustered by MSA/CMSA; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5.1: Fixed-effect estimation results for all US utility patents on all MSAs/CMSAs
coefficients on interaction terms are both positive and significant. With an ad-
ditional calculation using results from column (2), the elasticity of the counts of
VC deals with respect to the count of patents arrives at -0.136 (−0.0260+0.0267×
ln 0.016 = −0.136) when Federal R&D Fund is low (p25 of Federal R&D Fund in
millions) and arrives at 0.080 (−0.0260 + 0.0267 × ln 53.5335 = 0.080) when it is
high (p75 of Federal R&D Fund in millions). With an additional calculation us-
ing results from column (4), the elasticity of the counts of VC deals with respect
to the count of patents arrives at -0.059 (−0.00735 + 0.0124 × ln 0.016 = −0.059)
when Federal R&D Fund is low and arrives at 0.042 (−0.00735 + 0.0124 ×
ln 53.5335 = 0.042) when it is high. Therefore, results from table 5.1 confirm that
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there exists a positive relationship between VC investment activities and rates
of patenting and that there also exists the complementary relationship between
VC investment activities and federal R&D funding as suggested by Samila and
Sorenson (2010) [20] and Muscio, Quaglione, and Vallanti (2013) [16]. Addition-
ally, results here show that increasing VC deals could only increase the rates of
patenting when the presence of public research funding is high.1
Table 5.2 and table 5.3 are two OLS regressions with fixed effects estimates for
top 150 MSAs/CMSAs by total number of patents using two VC investment
measurements. Please remind that the number of observations drops because
only the top 150 MSAs/CMSAs are included in the regressions this time. As
can be seen from columns (1), (3), and (5) in the two tables, the coefficients on
Federal R&D Fund lose significance on the rates of IT patenting and remain
significant for AI and the entire patents selection. Whereas, all the coefficients
on VC activities measurement remain positive and significant. The comparison
suggests that the public research funding seems not to significantly influence IT
patenting behavior; while, change in VC investment activities remains to affect
the growth of AI and IT patents. On condition of within top 150 MSAs/CMSAs,
the elasticity of Federal R&D Fund with respect to the count of patents is the
highest for AI patents (0.0544) with comparison of 0.0543 for non-AI IT patents
and 0.0397 for all patents; the elasticity of the counts of VC deals with respect
to the count of patents is the highest for AI patents (0.0609) with comparison of
0.0514 for non-AI IT patents and 0.0461 for all patents. Similarly, the elasticity
of Federal R&D Fund with respect to the count of patents is the highest for AI
patents (0.0551) with comparison of 0.0538 for non-AI IT patents and 0.0420 for
all patents; the elasticity of the aggregated amount of VC deals with respect to
1Precisely, the Federal R&D Fund amount in millions need be greater than 0.102 when using
VC Deal Count as VC investment measurement and 0.042 when using VC Deal Amount.
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the count of patents is also the highest for AI patents (0.0296) with comparison
of 0.0191 for non-AI IT patents and 0.0227 for patents.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Patents Patents AI Patents AI Patents IT Patents IT Patents
Population (t-1) 1.085*** 1.077*** 0.345* 0.328* 1.195*** 1.181***
(0.157) (0.156) (0.182) (0.168) (0.226) (0.228)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0543** 0.0125 0.0544* -0.0286 0.0397 -0.0288
(0.0252) (0.0257) (0.0281) (0.0268) (0.0423) (0.0442)
VC Deal Count (t) 0.0348** -0.0404* 0.0646*** -0.0848*** 0.0482** -0.0752**
(0.0147) (0.0223) (0.0211) (0.0296) (0.0228) (0.0360)
VC Deal Count (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0246*** 0.0488*** 0.0403***
(0.00692) (0.00983) (0.0104)
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
R-squared 0.385 0.398 0.107 0.135 0.488 0.495
Number of MSA/CMSA 150 150 150 150 150 150
Time Period 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
MSA/CMSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression, clustered by MSA/CMSA; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5.2: Fixed-effect estimation results for all US utility patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT patents on VC
count (top 150 MSAs/CMSAs selected by total patent number)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Patents Patents AI Patents AI Patents IT Patents IT Patents
Population (t-1) 1.071*** 1.064*** 0.323* 0.309* 1.184*** 1.171***
(0.158) (0.156) (0.185) (0.172) (0.225) (0.227)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0538** 0.0268 0.0551** -0.00327 0.0420 -0.0165
(0.0254) (0.0248) (0.0279) (0.0258) (0.0431) (0.0429)
VC Deal Amount (t) 0.0180*** -0.0128 0.0281*** -0.0384*** 0.0156 -0.0511***
(0.00608) (0.00994) (0.00974) (0.0142) (0.0104) (0.0188)
VC Deal Amount (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0109*** 0.0235*** 0.0236***
(0.00358) (0.00534) (0.00545)
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
R-squared 0.385 0.394 0.106 0.127 0.487 0.495
Number of MSA/CMSA 150 150 150 150 150 150
Time Period 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
MSA/CMSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression, clustered by MSA/CMSA; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5.3: Fixed-effect estimation results for all US utility patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT patents on VC
amount (top 150 MSAs/CMSAs selected by total patent number)
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From columns (2), (4), and (6) in tables 5.2 and 5.3, it is also suggested that
the coefficients on the interaction terms between Federal R&D Fund and VC
investment activities on three selections of patents remain positive and signif-
icant. Specifically, from columns (2), (4), and (6) in table 5.2, the elasticity of
the counts of VC deals with respect to the count of patents arrives at -0.056
(−0.0404 + 0.0246 × ln 0.522 = −0.056) when Federal R&D Fund is low (p25 of
Federal R&D Fund in millions for Top 150 MSAs/CMSAs) and arrives at 0.071
(−0.0404+0.0246×ln 91.63701 = 0.071) when it is high (p75 of Federal R&D Fund
in millions for Top 150 MSAs/CMSAs). The elasticity of the counts of VC deals
with respect to the count of AI patents arrives at -0.117 when Federal R&D Fund
is low and arrives at 0.136 when it is high. The elasticity of the counts of VC
deals with respect to the count of IT patents arrives at -0.101 when Federal R&D
Fund is low and arrives at 0.107 when it is high. From columns (2), (4), and (6) in
table 5.3, the elasticity of the aggregated amount of VC deals with respect to the
count of patents arrives at -0.020 when Federal R&D Fund is low (p25 of Federal
R&D Fund in millions for Top 150 MSAs/CMSAs) and arrives at 0.036 when it
is high (p75 of Federal R&D Fund in millions for Top 150 MSAs/CMSAs). The
elasticity of the counts of VC deals with respect to the aggregated amount of
AI patents arrives at -0.054 when Federal R&D Fund is low and arrives at 0.068
when it is high. The elasticity of the aggregated amount of VC deals with re-
spect to the count of IT patents arrives at -0.066 when Federal R&D Fund is low
and arrives at 0.056 when it is high. Comparison of AI with IT patents provides
evidence of the positive effect of VC investment activities and the complemen-
tary relationship between VC investment activities and Federal R&D Fund on
AI and IT patenting. The elasticity of two measurements of VC investment ac-
tivities and Federal R&D Fund on AI patents are all the highest. As mentioned
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in table 5.1, VC investments also only increase the rates of AI and IT patent-
ing when the presence of Federal R&D Fund is high. Moreover, the elasticity
of two measurements of VC investment activities on AI patents is the highest
given a high presence of Federal R&D Fund. Finally, results after robustness
checks generally show consistency with the main regression tables 5.2 and 5.3.
Nevertheless, the significance of Federal R&D Fund appears occasionally on the
rates of AI patenting when altering the criteria of selecting top MSA/CMSA by
annual average population, changing the number of MSA/CMSA selected, and
applying a flexible search of AI patents.
5.2 Instrumental variable estimation results
While the fixed effects estimation help to identify the variation across and
within MSAs/CMSAs, there might still be unobserved county-level factors that
motivated one to apply the IV estimates. A rough assessment for the four ta-
bles reveals that VC deal count has a consistently larger elasticity on the rates
of patenting for three patent selections. Therefore, I only applied the IV es-
timates on VC count. As seen from the first stage results, the coefficient on
IV constructed is significant when predicting the VC deal count. As seen in
columns (2), (4), and (6), both coefficients on Federal R&D Fund and VC deal
count remain positive for patents and AI patents but not for IT patents. How-
ever, the significance level loses for most of the coefficients. As seen in columns
(3), (5), and (7), the significance of all interaction terms disappeared except
for IT patents. After an additional calculation, the elasticity of the aggregated
amount of VC deals with respect to the count of patents arrives at 0.112 when
Federal R&D Fund is low (p25 of Federal R&D Fund in millions for Top 150
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MSAs/CMSAs) and arrives at 0.110 when it is high (p75 of Federal R&D Fund
in millions for Top 150 MSAs/CMSAs). The elasticity of the counts of VC deals
with respect to the aggregated amount of AI patents arrives at 0.179 when Fed-
eral R&D Fund is low and arrives at 0.021 when it is high. The elasticity of the
aggregated amount of VC deals with respect to the count of IT patents arrives
at -0.022 when Federal R&D Fund is low and arrives at 0.103 when it is high.
In other words, both the positive effect of VC investments and complementary
effect are not robust to OLS results after importing IV estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES First Stage Patents Patents AI Patents AI Patents IT Patents IT Patents
LP Returns 0.313***
(0.0353)
Population (t-1) 0.100 1.075*** 1.075*** 0.348*** 0.355*** 1.190*** 1.184***
(0.123) (0.0616) (0.0620) (0.0982) (0.101) (0.133) (0.133)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.166*** 0.0425*** 0.0430 0.0583** 0.106 0.0335 -0.00430
(0.0271) (0.0152) (0.0330) (0.0238) (0.0752) (0.0301) (0.0569)
VC Deal Count (t) 0.111** 0.112 0.0395 0.159 0.0881 -0.00620
(0.0524) (0.0737) (0.0972) (0.132) (0.0996) (0.141)
VC Deal Count (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) -0.000358 -0.0306 0.0241
(0.0173) (0.0405) (0.0300)
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
R-squared 0.369 0.368 0.106 0.062 0.487 0.494
Number of MSA/CMSA 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
F-test (IV excl.) 78.70 43.97 78.70 43.97 78.70 20.12
F-test (IV intersection excl.) NA 20.12 NA 20.12 NA 43.97
Time Period 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
MSA/CMSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression, clustered by MSA/CMSA; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5.4: IV estimation results for all US utility patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT patents on VC count (top
150 MSAs/CMSAs selected by total patent number)
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
The strategy and framework devised in this thesis mainly contribute as a pre-
liminary attempt to document the recent regional patterns of us utility patents
and AI patents. Meanwhile, the thesis also intends to evaluate the complemen-
tary effect between public and private funding on accelerating inventive activi-
ties of cutting-edge technology like AI. To develop the analysis in depth, I also
constructed a comparison group containing non-AI but IT-related patents to in-
vestigate more on the difference in complementary effects between the frontier
and traditional technologies.
Using the panel data from 1990 to 2014 on top 150 metropolitan statistical ar-
eas (MSAs) and consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs) selected by
population and total patent number, I applied lag-structured OLS regressions
on US utility patents, US AI patents, and US non-AI IT patents, respectively,
with Fixed-Effect estimates and Instrumental estimates. Aligning with the pre-
vious findings from Samila and Sorenson (2010) [20], the fixed effects results
from table 5.1 revealed that i) VC investments played a decisive role in stimu-
lating patenting behavior; ii) the participation of VC investment would much
encourage the rate of patents with the presence of high public funding amount.
The comparison between three patent selections from tables 5.2 and 5.3 indi-
cated that the federal R&D support is less crucial on encouraging the growth
of traditional IT patents with the comparison of AI patents. By contrast, there
exists a significant and positive role of VC investments and the significant and
positive complementary effect between VC investments and federal R&D funds
for both AI and IT patents. Despite the difference in significance level, both Fed-
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eral R&D Fund and VC investments have the highest elasticity on the rates of AI
patenting. This fact implied that the development of frontier technologies such
as AI depends on both public and private financial support; while, traditional
technological development may much rely on private financial support. A pos-
sible explanation is that new technologies are more likely to exist as start-ups
and enterprises, which often have greater demands for financial aids.
After robustness checks, results remained robust to main OLS regressions with
mixed evidence on if federal R&D fund played a significant role in stimulating
AI patenting. After considering the heterogeneity of VC investments, I con-
structed the instrument variable (IV) named LP returns, as suggested by Samila
and Sorenson (2011) [21]. Not only the significance level disappear on VC mea-
surements and interaction terms, but it is also implied that the complementary
effect disappears for patents and AI patents. A takeaway from the IV regres-
sions is that the results with IV estimates failed to have a strong concordance
with findings from Samila and Sorenson (2010) [20]. IV results might have
weaker statistical significance and are not always consistent with the results
from OLS. Due to the time constraints, unfortunately, it has not been feasible
to provide explanations to these questions. Indeed, care should be taken to im-
prove IV construction in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSIONS
Back to the original study of the research questions, findings from this thesis
supported previous findings on the positive relationship between VC invest-
ments and growth in patenting and extended this conclusion with evidence on
AI patenting. Additional results from this study suggested that, however, fed-
eral R&D fund doesn’t always significantly influence traditional IT patenting
behaviors. After adding interactions between VC investment measurements
and federal R&D fund, I found complementary effects existed on overall rates
of patenting, AI patenting, and IT patenting. However, results from this the-
sis show that VC investments could only increase the rates of patenting when
there is a high presence of Federal R&D Funding. Additionally, VC investment
has the highest elasticity on the rates of AI patenting compared with the other
two selections. Although with an intention to improve the estimations, both
the positive relationship between VC investments and rates of patents and the
complementary effect lost significance after instrumented by the annual average
return to limited partners.
During the analysis, one of the difficulties this thesis has encountered is how to
carefully choose a consistent definition of utility patents, AI patents, and non-
AI IT patents. As one may point out, the time cut-off this thesis applied can
only avoid the lag between application and grant date for utility patents and AI
patents. The obstacle of making three perfect patent selections is largely caused
by the change form USPC to CPC system. First of all, the end date when USPTO
stopped issuing the USPC code is given by patent granted date instead of ap-
plication date (not to mention that there was no an official end date when this
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change ended). The nature of this study, however, requires one to use patent
application date so that the time lag between application and granted date will
not pollute the lag structure of panel data. Secondly, although there now ex-
ists several statistical crosswalks that could map CPC back to USPC, the actual
mapping presents enormous inconsistencies in the ways that CPC and USPC
define their scope of classes and sub-classes. Usually, there will be several CPC
matched with per USPC code (even after we only take the first classification
per patent). In other words, it’s almost unachievable to assign a unique CPC
code per USPC code. Since both the definition of non-AI and part of the AI
patents are developed based on USPC code, the ambiguity of crosswalk makes
it hard to identify new patents that is AI or non-AI IT patents. Consequently,
one should be extremely careful when including the most recent patents in both
AI and non-AI selection using the definitions mentioned. However, the AI in-
dustry itself has witnessed its most rapid growth in very current time. The
failure of including the most recent AI patent in the analysis might yield an-
other ”lag”, which is the discrepancy between the results from this study and
the latest trends in AI industrial development. In this thesis, however, I decided
to end the time-frame early enough to avoid the crosswalk for most recent AI
and IT patents. Ideally, a future crosswalk between USPC and CPC is planned
to solve this dilemma by updating the definitions using CPC code for both AI
and non-AI IT patents.
While the dilemma presented for the patent data used in this thesis, noteworthy
concerns have been gained about the VC data. As discussed earlier in the con-
clusion section, the regression with IV estimates shows a major difference from
previous findings. This problem motivated me to revisit the VC data. According
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to the summary statistics, the VC investments count from this thesis is generally
comparable with previous findings from Samila and Sorenson [20]. However,
the amount of VC investments are higher than their outcomes. The difference
might come from: i) measurement error/biases of VC fund performance data
as with portfolio companies [13]; or ii)different items for aggregation. It should,
however, be noted that several funds usually participate in each VC investment
round, and the amount a portfolio company received per round can be higher
than the amount each VC fund invested per round. Nevertheless, one of the
assumptions from this thesis is that the location of VC funds should be identical
to (except across the MSA/CMSA border) the location of portfolio companies
it invested at the MSA/CMSA level. The difference in amount should not in-
fluence the regression results theoretically. Future data quality checks should,
therefore, be produced by aggregating VC deals using the same aggregation
entity as Samila and Sorenson.
28
APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PATENT DATA
A.1 Utility patents
Figure A.1: Utility patents count with at least one US inventor
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A.2 Non-AI IT patents
Figure A.2: Non-AI IT patents count with at least one US inventor
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A.3 AI patents
Figure A.3: AI patents count with at least one US inventor
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APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VENTURE CAPITAL DATA
B.1 Venture capital investment count
Figure B.1: VC deal count as with portfolio companies
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B.2 Venture capital investment amount
Figure B.2: VC deal disclosed amount as with portfolio companies
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APPENDIX C
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
C.1 Top 150 MSAs/CMSAs by annual average population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Patents Patents AI Patents AI Patents IT Patents IT Patents
Population (t-1) 1.260*** 1.247*** 0.343* 0.316* 1.248*** 1.224***
(0.145) (0.142) (0.180) (0.163) (0.221) (0.222)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0611*** 0.0237 0.0356 -0.0404* 0.0298 -0.0391
(0.0228) (0.0237) (0.0229) (0.0221) (0.0390) (0.0388)
VC Deal Count (t) 0.0461*** -0.0291 0.0609*** -0.0917*** 0.0514** -0.0869**
(0.0151) (0.0226) (0.0208) (0.0274) (0.0222) (0.0347)
VC Deal Count (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0259*** 0.0526*** 0.0477***
(0.00700) (0.00995) (0.0104)
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
R-squared 0.339 0.354 0.100 0.136 0.430 0.442
Number of MSA/CMSA 150 150 150 150 150 150
Time Period 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
MSA/CMSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression, clustered by MSA/CMSA; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table C.1: Fixed-effect estimation results for all US utility patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT patents on VC
count (top 150 MSAs/CMSAs selected by annual average population)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Patents Patents AI Patents AI Patents IT Patents IT Patents
Population (t-1) 1.242*** 1.232*** 0.320* 0.298* 1.236*** 1.214***
(0.146) (0.142) (0.182) (0.167) (0.221) (0.219)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0606*** 0.0355 0.0349 -0.0198 0.0308 -0.0261
(0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0227) (0.0209) (0.0396) (0.0380)
VC Deal Amount (t) 0.0227*** -0.00844 0.0296*** -0.0383*** 0.0191* -0.0515***
(0.00643) (0.0101) (0.00958) (0.0129) (0.00991) (0.0174)
VC Deal Amount (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0117*** 0.0256*** 0.0266***
(0.00370) (0.00538) (0.00543)
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
R-squared 0.339 0.349 0.100 0.128 0.429 0.441
Number of MSA/CMSA 150 150 150 150 150 150
Time Period 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
MSA/CMSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression, clustered by MSA/CMSA; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table C.2: Fixed-effect estimation results for all US utility patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT patents on VC
amount (top 150 MSAs/CMSAs selected by annual average population)
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C.2 Alternative selection of top 100 MSAs/CMSAs by total
patent number
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Patents Patents AI Patents AI Patents IT Patents IT Patents
Population (t-1) 1.335*** 1.333*** 0.404 0.400* 1.655*** 1.653***
(0.178) (0.179) (0.252) (0.237) (0.265) (0.269)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0181 -0.0266 0.0308 -0.0715 0.0218 -0.0484
(0.0370) (0.0392) (0.0444) (0.0467) (0.0515) (0.0601)
VC Deal Count (t) 0.0316* -0.0490 0.0655** -0.119** 0.0420 -0.0847*
(0.0179) (0.0336) (0.0282) (0.0455) (0.0273) (0.0493)
VC Deal Count (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0236*** 0.0539*** 0.0370***
(0.00873) (0.0123) (0.0125)
Observations 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400
R-squared 0.473 0.485 0.132 0.157 0.637 0.643
Number of MSA/CMSA 100 100 100 100 100 100
Time Period 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
MSA/CMSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression, clustered by MSA/CMSA; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table C.3: Fixed-effect estimation results for all US utility patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT patents on VC
count (top 100 MSAs/CMSAs selected by total patent number)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Patents Patents AI Patents AI Patents IT Patents IT Patents
Population (t-1) 1.324*** 1.325*** 0.381 0.383 1.646*** 1.648***
(0.179) (0.178) (0.258) (0.240) (0.265) (0.265)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0184 -0.00980 0.0311 -0.0432 0.0238 -0.0307
(0.0372) (0.0374) (0.0441) (0.0449) (0.0526) (0.0576)
VC Deal Amount (t) 0.0128* -0.0208 0.0277** -0.0607*** 0.0130 -0.0519**
(0.00750) (0.0152) (0.0131) (0.0218) (0.0132) (0.0246)
VC Deal Amount (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0104** 0.0275*** 0.0201***
(0.00460) (0.00655) (0.00668)
Observations 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400
R-squared 0.472 0.479 0.130 0.151 0.637 0.642
Number of MSA/CMSA 100 100 100 100 100 100
Time Period 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
MSA/CMSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression, clustered by MSA/CMSA; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table C.4: Fixed-effect estimation results for all US utility patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT patents on VC
amount (top 100 MSAs/CMSAs selected by total patent number)
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C.3 Selection of MSAs/CMSAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Patents Patents AI Patents AI Patents IT Patents IT Patents
Population (t-1) 1.111*** 1.090*** 0.319** 0.280** 1.021*** 0.985***
(0.129) (0.128) (0.128) (0.116) (0.170) (0.172)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0802*** 0.0474** 0.0479*** -0.0115 0.0478 -0.00722
(0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0184) (0.0155) (0.0303) (0.0295)
VC Deal Count (t) 0.0484*** -0.0260 0.0569*** -0.0781*** 0.0618*** -0.0631**
(0.0129) (0.0185) (0.0163) (0.0218) (0.0195) (0.0275)
VC Deal Count (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0267*** 0.0486*** 0.0449***
(0.00614) (0.00864) (0.00887)
Observations 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952
R-squared 0.215 0.225 0.074 0.110 0.316 0.326
Number of MSA/CMSA 248 248 248 248 248 248
Time Period 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
MSA/CMSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression, clustered by MSA/CMSA; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table C.5: Fixed-effect estimation results for all US utility patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT patents on VC
count (all MSA/CMSA)
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C.4 Alternative definition of AI patents on top 150 MSAs/CMSAs
by total patent number
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Patents Patents AI Patents AI Patents IT Patents IT Patents
Population (t-1) 1.085*** 1.077*** 0.390** 0.373** 1.195*** 1.181***
(0.157) (0.156) (0.187) (0.170) (0.225) (0.228)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0543** 0.0125 0.0668** -0.0200 0.0389 -0.0298
(0.0252) (0.0257) (0.0278) (0.0261) (0.0421) (0.0440)
VC Deal Count (t) 0.0348** -0.0404* 0.0728*** -0.0834*** 0.0480** -0.0756**
(0.0147) (0.0223) (0.0209) (0.0291) (0.0228) (0.0360)
VC Deal Count (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0246*** 0.0510*** 0.0404***
(0.00692) (0.00960) (0.0103)
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
R-squared 0.385 0.398 0.117 0.147 0.488 0.496
Number of MSA/CMSA 150 150 150 150 150 150
Time Period 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
MSA/CMSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression, clustered by MSA/CMSA; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table C.6: Fixed-effect estimation results for all US utility patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT patents on VC
count (top 150 MSAs/CMSAs selected by total patent number)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Patents Patents AI Patents AI Patents IT Patents IT Patents
Population (t-1) 1.071*** 1.064*** 0.367* 0.352** 1.184*** 1.171***
(0.158) (0.156) (0.190) (0.175) (0.225) (0.227)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0538** 0.0268 0.0682** 0.00549 0.0412 -0.0172
(0.0254) (0.0248) (0.0276) (0.0251) (0.0429) (0.0427)
VC Deal Amount (t) 0.0180*** -0.0128 0.0300*** -0.0415*** 0.0155 -0.0511***
(0.00608) (0.00994) (0.00958) (0.0141) (0.0104) (0.0188)
VC Deal Amount (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0109*** 0.0253*** 0.0236***
(0.00358) (0.00520) (0.00545)
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
R-squared 0.385 0.394 0.114 0.138 0.488 0.496
Number of MSAs/CMSAs/CMSA 150 150 150 150 150 150
Time Period 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
MSA/CMSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression, clustered by MSA/CMSA; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table C.7: Fixed-effect estimation results for all US utility patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT patents on VC
amount (top 150 MSAs/CMSAs selected by total patent number)
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C.5 Alternative selection of patents with USPC code on top 150
MSAs/CMSAs by total patent number
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Patents Patents AI Patents AI Patents IT Patents IT Patents
Population (t-1) 1.138*** 1.131*** 0.374** 0.364** 1.195*** 1.181***
(0.156) (0.156) (0.147) (0.143) (0.225) (0.228)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0523** 0.0144 0.00864 -0.0432 0.0389 -0.0298
(0.0257) (0.0266) (0.0253) (0.0264) (0.0421) (0.0440)
VC Deal Count (t) 0.0243 -0.0440* 0.0517*** -0.0416 0.0480** -0.0756**
(0.0155) (0.0224) (0.0183) (0.0258) (0.0228) (0.0360)
VC Deal Count (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0223*** 0.0305*** 0.0404***
(0.00689) (0.00897) (0.0103)
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
R-squared 0.843 0.845 0.141 0.151 0.488 0.496
Number of MSA/CMSA 150 150 150 150 150 150
Time Period 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
MSA/CMSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression, clustered by MSA/CMSA; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table C.8: Fixed-effect estimation results for all US utility patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT patents on VC
count (top 150 MSAs/CMSAs selected by total patent number)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Patents Patents AI Patents AI Patents IT Patents IT Patents
Population (t-1) 1.124*** 1.118*** 0.363** 0.353** 1.184*** 1.171***
(0.156) (0.156) (0.150) (0.145) (0.225) (0.227)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0507* 0.0251 0.0111 -0.0291 0.0412 -0.0172
(0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0429) (0.0427)
VC Deal Amount (t) 0.0162** -0.0130 0.0169** -0.0289** 0.0155 -0.0511***
(0.00642) (0.0101) (0.00840) (0.0129) (0.0104) (0.0188)
VC Deal Amount (t)
Federal R&D Fund (t-1) 0.0103*** 0.0162*** 0.0236***
(0.00355) (0.00459) (0.00545)
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
R-squared 0.843 0.845 0.138 0.148 0.488 0.496
Number of MSA/CMSA 150 150 150 150 150 150
Time Period 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014 1990-2014
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
MSA/CMSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression, clustered by MSA/CMSA; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table C.9: Fixed-effect estimation results for all US utility patents, AI patents, and non-AI IT patents on VC
amount (top 150 MSAs/CMSAs selected by total patent number)
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